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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the deteminants of the international trade in waste
between developed countries. Data from the 1980s suggest that while the
trade in waste between developed and less developed countries has garnered
the most attention, the preponderance of waste flows have been among the
developed countries. We examine both economic and institutional factors
governing incentives to export and import waste. In particular, we find that
countries with high cost of disposal tend to export but that low urban-rural
population ratios, industry share in GDP, and population densities are also
relevant for explaining the amount of waste that crosses national borders.

1 Introduction
Recently there has been increasing attention paid by the press and by policy-
makers to the trade in solid and hazardous wastes across national boundaries.
The debate over the trade in waste has focussed largely on the pros and cons
of situating waste disposal sites in less developed countries. In particular,
the arguments have centered on the potential gains from economic 'efficiency'
in the form of lower costs, and the undesirability of situating disposal sites
in countries that do not have proper facilities to handle the waste in an
environmentally sound manner.
The available data has suggested that the trade in waste has been growing
at a rapid rate. As developed countries begin to implement higher environ-
mental standards and as costs for waste disposal rise, there has been fear that
the generators of hazardous waste are increasingly tempted to avoid the cost
rises and dump the waste in less developed countries. In particular, there has
been concern that, given the high debt burdens faced by these less developed
countries, the importation of hazardous waste provides a source of short-run
revenue that poorer countries will find difficult to refuse. The concerns are
heightened if the waste disposal facilities are inadequate, resulting in long
term environmental damage.
Two highly publicized recent incidents increased public attention on the
North-South trade in hazardous waste. The ship, Khian Sea, spent two
years in the late 1980's searching for a country to unload its cargo of toxic
incinerator ash before it allegedly dumped its cargo in the Indian Ocean.
In December 1991, the Economist published the text of an internal memo
by Lawrence Summers, then chief economist at the World Bank, over the
desirability of situating dirty industries in less developed countries.
However, contrary to the popular belief that most of the trade is from
developed countries to less developed countries, an OECD report in 1985
noted that over 80 percent of the trade in hazardous trade was between
developed countries.' While other reports tend to attribute a larger share
of the waste movements to the North-South trade,2 it is difficult to refute
the OECD claim that a substantial amount of waste is moving from one
developed country to another.
In this paper, we compile the existing data and suggest possible motivat-
ing factors for the waste trade among developed countries. We investigate
the different environmental policies and institutions governing waste disposal
in a number of developed countries and analyze whether these national dis-
parities help to explain the exports and imports of waste. As a first step in
assisting governments in both developed and less developed countries as they
begin to address the issue of waste trading in their national environmental
policies, we provide an analysis of the economic factors involved in the deci-
sion by the private agents to export and the decision by government to allow
imports. We caution that the data on waste trade exports and imports are
scant at best. There is no international authority charged with the respon-
sibility of monitoring this trade, and until recently the domestic authorities
in most of the countries appear to have neglected the tracking of this aspect
of waste disposal, although national regulations do exist.
We focus on the movement of both solid waste and non-nuclear hazardous
waste. This is essential since every country has a different definition of haz-
ardous waste thus complicating cross-national comparisons and making an
analysis of data on solely hazardous waste even more tenuous. In addition,
recent high profile news stories on stranded shipments of so-called 'trash'
have illuminated the problem that the long-run toxic properties of many
substances are unknown and policy-makers tend to lump both non-hazardous
and hazardous solid waste together when considering what actions to take.
In examining the determinants of the international trade in waste, we
1 Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous Waste Paris: OECD, 1985
2 "International Trade in Hazardous Waste Increases in 1988, University Professors Say"
International Environmental Reporter Feb 1989
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focus on the economic incentives for exporters and importers. Producers of
waste consider cost differentials of domestic versus foreign disposal. If do-
mestic facilities are inadequate to handle waste, then exports are necessary.
Where landfills and incineration plants are both available, landfills are sub-
stantially less expensive than incineration in the short run as a method of
disposal. We will consider whether incineration and landfill costs help ex-
plain the direction of trade. In a tightly packed continent such as Europe,
it is possible that the distance between a waste generator and a foreign dis-
posal facility is less than the distance between the point of generation and
a domestic disposal facility. We will therefore consider whether transporta-
tion costs and the placement of national boundaries explain the movement
of waste. Furthermore, if there are economies of scale in disposal, the exis-
tence of a facility that is better served by several countries may explain the
volume of exports that we observe. We will also expect that discrepancies in
potential liabilities will substantially affect the decision to dispose of waste
domestically.
Since waste is regulated to some extent in all developed countries, both
the extent and the severity of environmental regulations are potential deter-
minants of the decision to export. If, in fact, these regulatory discrepancies
are a primary factor in the waste trade, then we must answer the question
of why countries so seemingly similar impose such varying regulations. Such
discrepancies may be determined by several factors, including differences in
industry mix, the degree of urbanization, income distribution, and historical
incidents involving environmental damage.
The remainder of the paper is divided into 7 sections. In Section 2, we
present the evidence on the waste trade that is available to date. We present
a simple model of the decision to export waste in Section 3. Section 4 is a
summary of the regulations in various countries, while section 5 analyses the
different motivating factors for exporting and importing waste. In section 6,
we consider why governments choose to impose either lax or strict regulations.
We conclude and discuss further research in Section 7.
2 Evidence
Most of the data presented in this section comes from OECD publications,
with some information provided by Greenpeace. 3 Data on exports of waste
appear to be more readily available than data on imports. As shown in Table
1, almost all of the OECD countries in the late 1980's participated in the
waste trade. The table also shows that the comparability of the numbers
across countries is poor as numbers rarely exist for different countries in the
same year. Recognizing this problem, we still consider an examination of the
data to be revealing.
OECD figures suggest that Germany is the greatest exporter of waste
in tonnage. In 1988, 5.7 percent of its waste was exported. More recent
statistics show that percentage to have more than tripled. West Germany
generated 14.21 million tons of hazardous waste in 1988, over 7 times the
waste generated by the United Kingdom and over 10 times the amount pro-
duced by Denmark. The increase in waste generation over the late 1980s in
many major developed countries has occurred at the same time that these
countries have seen a decrease in their landfill capacity. West Germany saw
a decrease in its landfill capacity of 24 percent from 1985 to 1989. In the
United States, the US General Accounting Office reported that over 2,700
landfills closed in the early 1980s while the amount of hazardous waste gen-
erated increased from 9 million tons in 1970 to 268 million tons in 1986. One
of the other major exporters in Europe is Austria, which authorized over 43
3 There are numerous discrepancies between the OECD and Greenpeace figures. For
example, the OECD claims that Denmark exported only 9,000 tons of waste in 1988.
However, Greenpeace reports Belgium claims that it imported 200,000 tons from Denmark
in 1989. At the same time, the OECD asserted that in 1988, Denmark only produced
112,000 tons of waste. Could such a dramatic increase in waste production and export
occur in one year?
percent of its generated waste to be exported in 1987. The largest shares
from Austria were sent to the former East Germany, the United Kingdom
and West Germany. Even among OECD countries that do not export heavily,
there are some like Belgium which use their geographical location to act as
a hub for waste traffic. In particular, the southern French speaking region of
Wallonia in Belgium diverts waste from Central Europe to northern France
and the United Kingdom.
Data on imports were available for only 5 countries, Canada, France,
West Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom.4 Both OECD
and Greenpeace seem to agree that France is the biggest importer of waste
in the EC and suggest that it is the major dumping ground for waste not
accepted in other European countries. However, Michel Mousel of the Direc-
tor of the Pollution Prevention Department of the Ministry of Environment
in France claimed that "globally, the waste of foreign origin only represents
5 percent of the volume treated in France, and in no way justifies the sen-
sational headlines calling France 'the wastebin of Europe."' 5  The United
Kingdom is also considered a major importer. An article in the Economic
Review in 1991 suggested that of all British imports, 10 percent came from
the United States, 36 percent came from the Netherlands, 22 percent came
from Belgium and 12 percent from Switzerland, suggesting that less than 20
percent may be coming from less developed countries. 6 In fact, according
to U.K. authorities, the United Kingdom imports waste from 26 different
countries. Furthermore, Greenpeace figures reveal that waste imports in the
United Kingdom rose from 5 thousand tons in 1983 to 180 thousand tons
4 Whether imports are nonexistent or unreported for the remaining countries cannot be
evaluated with the OECD numbers.
5 The International Trade in Waste: A Greenpeace Inventory 1990
6 Greenpeace's list of waste exporting countries show that some developed Asian coun-
tries are also exporting to the U.K, specifically Hong Kong and Singapore. Other less
developed countries found exporting include the Philippines and Panama.
in 1987.' Figures provided by both organizations verify that movements of
waste among the EC countries are prevalent and substantial.
3 A Simple Model of Waste Trade
We consider a model in which the decision by generators of waste to export
is a result of the minimization of their disposal costs. Firms in the home
country, denoted by the subscript h, have a choice of disposing their waste at
home or of sending it to a site in one of a number of different foreign countries.
We assume that there are F foreign countries indexed by f = 1,..., F. Firms
in the home country will calculate the difference between the cost of disposal
at home, Dh, and the cost of disposing the waste abroad, Df, for each of the
foreign countries. The minimum cost will determine the location of disposal.
min(Dh, Df)
We divide the cost of disposing in any location, Di, into 3 terms: the
actual cost of disposal at the site, Cf, the transportation cost of moving the
waste, Ti, either from the home country to the foreign dumpsite or within
the home country, and the expected potential liability, Li.
DA = C, + T + L; i = h,f
C,(si, p, Ri) is the cost of disposal at site i, and depends on Ri, the regula-
tions in the country, pi, the availability of a facility, and si, the size of the
facility. Ri ranges from 0 to so, where oo is a complete ban on the disposing
7 The International Trade in Waste: A Greenpeace Inventory 1990
of such waste. Costs of disposal is increasing in regulations.
a >, Ri= [ , oo)
Ci(oo,.,.) = 00
C(', 1,.) = 00
py determines whether a facility exists in the foreign country. If pf is
zero, it means that no facility exists. If one does exist, pf is 1. The cost of
disposal when a plant does not exist is infinity. sf is the size of the plant. We
assume that such disposal sites exhibit increasing returns to scale. As the
size of a facility rises, the average cost of disposal falls. The transportation
cost Ty is a function of two variables, the distance between the generator and
the foreign disposal site, dy, and the mode of transportation, m.
Tf = dfm
The final term is the expected liability should leakage occur once the waste
has been deposited. This is the discounted penalty cost multiplied by the
probability of damage occurring.
We make a few observations. First, the cost functions C for the home
and foreign countries do not have to be the same. Countries may have very
different disposal facilities. When discussing technologies for waste disposal,
the most obvious examples are landfills and incinerators. Secondly, there is
no reason to assume that the distance between the generator and the foreign
disposal site df is greater than the distance between the generator and the
home disposal site dh. Thirdly, the expected liability is the discounted sum
of the potential liability of every period into the indefinite future.
We now examine information on regulations, availability and cost of dif-
fering types of disposal, transportation costs, and potential liability in the
OECD.
4 Regulations on Waste Trade between De-
veloped Countries
While there has been a major focus on the potentially harmful impact of the
hazardous waste trade on less developed countries, there is still dispute over
whether the same concern should be accorded to the waste trade between
developed countries. If countries have the same disposal capabilities and can
guarantee sound environmental management and safe transportation of the
waste, then in theory waste can be treated as a normal traded good. Re-
search has suggested that with the appropriate monitoring procedures and
proper disposal facilities in the importing country, the waste trade can be an
efficient means to hazardous waste disposal.8 Proponents of this viewpoint
look to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Canada. Over
90 percent of the exports of waste from the United States end up in Canada,
primarily in an incinerator in Ontario and a landfill near Montreal and are
believed to be disposed of as soundly as they would have been in the United
States. The procedure for Prior Informed Consent which requires that the
exporter obtain the approval of the government of the importing country
prior to any export of hazardous waste, and the high level of environmental
supervision on Canada's part contribute to this economically efficient and
environmentally sound outcome. However, the United States has a similar
bilateral agreement with Mexico that has been less effective. The lack of
monitoring and enforcement across the border have led to "sham recycling"
and "illegal shipments" into Mexico. Hilz and Ehrenfeld (1991) conclude
that while bilateral agreements work well between similarly developed coun-
tries, they can be problematic between a highly industrialized country and a
less developed one. We will discuss the efficiency of the waste trade among
developed countries in a latter section.
8Hilz and Ehrenfeld, "Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes" International
Environmental Affairs. 1991
While we will not directly analyze all the various policy options, it is
worth mentioning that a number of different solutions have been proposed to
deal with the international trade in hazardous waste. They include a policy of
free trade, a global ban, regional agreements, global agreements and bilateral
agreements. Debates over the superiority of any one option have centered on
the issues of implementability, equity, efficiency and sustainability. However,
to analyze the movements of the waste trade among the developed coun-
tries, it may be useful to understand the regulatory framework under which
this trade is occurring. Among the developed countries, there have been 4
major frameworks, the EC Directives, the OECD Directives, the UN Basel
Convention, and for the US, the bilateral agreement with Canada.
The EC directives and the OECD guidelines are very similar. They do
not prohibit exports by member countries to non-member states but they
do establish reporting and consenting requirements in those instances. The
exporter must show the existence of a waste disposal contract with a facility
in the non-member state capable of handling the waste properly. Among the
weaknesses in both frameworks is the ambiguity over the definition of 'sound
environmental management' and the lack of liability in cases of accidents and
negligence. After joining the United Nations Environmental Programme, the
OECD ceased its efforts, and currently the governing regulations on the trade
in hazardous waste are provided by the UN.
The UN first addressed the issue of waste exports in 1972, in Principle 21
of the Stockholm Declaration, requiring nations to conduct extraterritorial
waste disposal safely. In 1978, they set down the Cairo Guidelines and Prin-
ciples which were aimed at assisting countries in developing sound policies
for hazardous waste management. It was not until 1989 with the Basel Con-
vention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal that strict regulations concerning waste exports were set
out. Monitoring procedures were adopted through a requirement for noti-
fication and prior informed consent, a manifest system and the submission
of a yearly report. In particular, the Basel Convention prohibits exports to
the Antarctic region, to states not parties to the Convention, to states which
have national regulations prohibiting waste imports, and to states which are
unlikely to dispose of the waste soundly in the opinion of the exporting coun-
try. There are provisions to allow trade if the country which is exporting does
not have the necessary technical capacity or suitable disposal facilities.
However, even with these guidelines set down by the UN and approved by
the 116 nations present, 9 there are still major disparities in national regula-
tions among the developed countries. Such disparities in regulations may help
to explain the tremendous movements of waste among them. Below, we sum-
marize some of the environmental rules applicable in the OECD countries.
We can identify four parties involved in hazardous waste management: the
generators of hazardous wastes, the carriers, the disposers and the national
governments. We deal with the issue of governments in a latter section.
4.1 Generators of hazardous wastes
While there are no obligations for generators of hazardous wastes under in-
ternational law, all the major developed countries do appear to have their
own set of national regulations for generators. In particular, Germany and
Austria appear to have some of the most stringent regulations. Both coun-
tries require generators to obtain permission in order to dispose of the waste
themselves, to provide information to authorities, to keep a register contain-
ing various bits of information, to complete a trip ticket, and to transfer their
waste to a given site. At the same time, only 4 of the OECD countries at-
tempt to place obligations on the generators not to produce certain types of
wastes. They are Finland, France, Switzerland and the Netherlands. This is
significant since the Basel Convention set as its goal "to make it (waste dis-
posal) so costly and difficult that industry will find it more profitable to cut
90Only 33 nations signed it at the time.
down on waste production and ... recycle what waste they produce."10 With
so many closures of landfills anticipated, estimated at about 50,000 in the
EC, even with no increase in waste generation, disposal will still be a prob-
lem. A vital component of any long term waste disposal solution'must be an
decrease in the amount of waste generated. The obligation to recover or recy-
cle certain types of wastes is laid down by Finland, Norway, the Netherlands,
Japan, France, Switzerland and Italy. Nearly all countries with hazardous
waste legislation require producers to obtain special permission to dispose of
the waste themselves, the exceptions being Canada and Switzerland.
4.2 Carriers
Carriers of hazardous wastes are in general obligated to obtain special au-
thorization, to provide consignment notes identifying the waste being trans-
ported, and to notify the authorities in cases of accidents. The countries
with the strictest regulations on carriers appear to be Germany, Austria,
the United States and Canada. A large number of countries do not require
carriers to take out special insurance policies. The countries that do require
carriers to take out insurance or provide financial sureties are Germany, Aus-
tria, Switzerland, Belgium, Canada, the United States and Sweden.
4.3 Disposers
Obligations of disposers of hazardous waste under general international law
apply only to certain lakes and international watercourses, and fall within
the scope of the ADR (European Agreement concerning the International
Carriage of Dangerous Goods). Under EC Directives, European disposers
are obligated to be specifically authorized, to separate toxic and hazardous
waste from other substances, to keep a register or supply information to the
10 "Emerging Controls on Transfers of Hazardous Waste to Developing Countries," Law
and Policy in International Business Vol 21, 1989
authorities, and to record and identify waste for each disposal site. The
tightest regulations are imposed by Germany, Austria, Canada, the United
States. The least regulated appears to be Switzerland and Denmark. Again,
there are still many developed countries that do not require disposers to take
out insurance policies, although almost all of them place the obligation on
disposers to record the location of each deposit.
5 Motivating Factors for Waste Exports
In this section, we focus on the economic factors involved in the decision
by private agents to export and the decision by governments to allow im-
ports. Many governments in less developed countries have explicitly banned
hazardous waste imports, although imports have subsequently been docu-
mented. Numerous examples of this can be found in studies of countries
in Africa. The lack of financial resources and regulatory infrastructure may
make the decisions by these governments to ban imports non-enforceable.
We assume that among the developed countries, government regulations are
enforced, and any imports are legally accepted imports, although we recog-
nize the possible existence of illegal dumps. Since regulation is inextricably
tied to the issue of hazardous waste disposal, we will consider how differing
regulatory environments and access to different technologies across countries
determine the flow of waste.
5.1 Environmental laws
Intuitively, one would expect the countries with the strictest environmental
laws to be the most likely to export. As countries impose stricter regulations
on the disposal of hazardous waste, there is an added incentive to export
the waste abroad, either illegally dumping it in less developed countries, or
exporting it to countries where the disposal costs are lower. Stricter regula-
tions may be in the form of banning disposal of certain types of chemicals
and waste, or in the form of requiring better treatment prior to disposal and
thus higher costs. There is clear evidence that Germany is a major exporter
of waste, and that France is one of the major importers of waste. Germany
exports dredging sludge which may not be spread on German soils because
of its high toxicity. According to the latest figures, France, which has some
of the weakest regulations, exports 1.5 percent of its waste produced and im-
ports 6 times as much as it exports. In 1988/1989, France imported 10 times
the amount of hazardous wastes imported by Germany. Austria, which has
strict regulations on generators, carriers and disposers, exported 43.5 percent
of its waste generated in 1987. Denmark, which appears to have relatively
weak regulations on disposers, exports only about 8 percent of its waste. At
the same time, however, Finland and Switzerland, which appear to have no
stricter obligations than Denmark, do export a much higher percentage of
their wastes, 24 percent and 27 percent respectively.
The United Kingdom's environmental regulations have been described as
"lax", "haphazard", "ramshackle", and "antediluvian". 1  While there are
no records of any toxic waste being exported from the United Kingdom,
imports grew ten-fold from 1984 to 1991. Although on paper it appears
as though the obligations placed on carriers, generators and disposers by
the British government are similar to many of their European counterparts,
the United Kingdom leaves responsibility for its waste disposal in the hands
of 200 Waste Disposal Authorities (WDAs). These WDAs often perform
two conflicting functions, operating the waste disposal facilities as well as
overseeing regulations. As a result, in the past, the 200 WDAs together
with the local authorities have applied widely differing standards across the
country, and have been accused of lax regulatory oversight, and thus lowering
costs and enabling them to price their waste disposal services below that of
11Redston and Thomas,"The Economics of Toxic Waste," The Economic Review Vol 8,
no. 5 May 1991
their rivals in other countries. The WDAs are soon to be replaced by new
Waste Regulation Authorities. However, the revamping of environmental
standards in the United Kingdom, including those for waste disposal have
been shelved to some extent as a result of the recent recession.
On the other side of the Atlantic, the United States and Canada both have
strict environmental standards and yet the United States exports less than
1 percent of its waste and Canada exports less than 4 percent of its trash.
The existence of the bilateral agreement between the 2 countries ensures the
existence of a safe export destination with lower cost. The distance to an
alternative disposal country may explain the lack of waste exports.
It appears that for a number of the developed countries, the disparate
environmental standards do explain the direction of the waste trade, the
prime examples being Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Countries
with strict environmental standards tend to export a higher percentage of
their waste than the countries which have lax regulations. However, for
countries, such as Finland and Switzerland, it is difficult to attribute their
high percentage of exports to strict environmental laws since they do not
have unusually tight standards.
5.2 Disposal Facilities Availability-Landfills and In-
cineration Plants
The Basel Convention permits trade in waste when the exporting country is
unable to dispose of the hazardous waste in a sound environmental manner.
This may be due to lack of suitable landfills or incinerators. Consider the
case of Ireland which has no national waste incinerators. The country dis-
poses over 70 percent of its waste overseas. While there are plans to build
an incinerator, Ireland produces only 5,000 of the 8,000 tons that would be
necessary for the incinerator to be economically feasible. The economic vi-
ability of the plant would entail the importation of 3,000 tons of hazardous
waste from abroad. There has been continuing opposition from the public
to the concept of importing waste, and as long as Ireland prohibits the im-
port of waste, the incinerator is economically infeasible. On the other hand,
the British government has tended to encourage trade in waste in the past,
asserting that it has a first class technology for dealing with waste. Its ar-
gument of comparative advantage in environmental technology however does
not seem to be supported by the overwhelming popularity of landfill as a
method of disposal and does not suggest a high technology industry. Eco-
nomically speaking, as we shall see in the next section, the UK does have a
comparative advantage in costs.
France has dumping grounds and incinerators for wastes not tolerated in
West Germany and Switzerland. However, it is not clear whether France's
facilities are any better than its neighbors for dealing with these particular
types of waste. It is worth noting that Switzerland had considered the con-
struction of an incinerator but faced public opposition, as did Greece. This
may help to explain why Switzerland exports 27 percent of its waste gener-
ated, even though its environmental standards are not particularly stringent.
Finland has one incineration plant for hazardous waste, does not appear to
have very strict regulations but continues to export 28 percent of its waste
aboard. The Finnish Ministry of the Environment asserted that the inciner-
ation plants handles almost all of the country's waste. However, Greenpeace
has received reports that the waste generated in Finland is greater than the
capacity of the incinerator and that PCBs are being sent to the UK. 12
While the existence of suitable sites for landfills is often a matter of
natural geological formations within the country, the construction of an in-
cineration plant is an endogenous variable. Governments choose whether to
build an incineration plant, recognizing that the lack of one may spur ex-
ports of waste. As a result, we recognize that the issue of the availability of
12The International Trade in Waste: A Greenpeace Inventoryl990
incineration plants is highly linked to government regulations.
5.3 Disposal Costs-Incineration and Landfill
Some countries do not have any appropriate disposal facilities and therefore
must export their wastes abroad; however, among the countries that do have
domestic waste disposal capabilities, we consider whether relative costs play
a role in the direction of trade. Recent findings on incineration costs in some
of the developed countries find that Germany has the highest per ton in-
cineration cost, while the Netherlands and Denmark follow closely at about
$115 per ton.13 Norway, and France all have higher incineration costs than
the United States and the United Kingdom, as one can see from Table 2.
It is tempting to link the incineration cost to the severity of environmental
regulations in these countries. It is certainly true that higher standards lead
to higher disposal costs, as authorities require that better, newer and more
expensive technology be installed to operate a waste disposal facility. How-
ever, it is worth noting that Denmark has relatively lax regulations as well
as the third highest incineration cost, and that France has looser regulations
than the United States but higher costs.
In Europe, availability and therefore cost of landfill space also varies sub-
stantially. Britain has good impermeable rubbish dumps in the Midlands
and South East England, although some of these pits tend to be far from the
cities which generate the waste. In particular, there is a network of incin-
erators, treatment plants, and old quarries. The stable rock foundation and
impermeable clay soil facilitate safe disposal. Landfill costs in the United
Kingdom are consequently one third that of West Germany. The Nether-
lands on the other hand not only has high incineration cost but also finds
it hard to dig holes since much of the country is lying at or below sea level.
13
"All that Remains: A Survey of Waste and the Environment," The Economist, May
29, 1993
It exports 12.5 percent of its waste, and has landfill cost of $44 per ton, al-
most twice the cost of the United Kingdom. Among the countries for which
landfill costs are available, West Germany has the highest cost per ton, $60,
with high costs for Denmark and Sweden, both at $54 per ton respectively.
The UK and France have the lowest costs, $24 per ton in the UK and $20
per ton in France. This major disparity in landfill costs suggest why many
generators all over Europe would prefer to export to England and France,
even though they must incur transportation costs.
5.4 Disposal Costs-Transportation costs, national bound-
aries, economies of scale
We now examine the issue of whether exports are explained by the proximity
of disposal facilities. Countries in Europe are closely situated and given the
numerous borders for any given country, it is quite likely that a generator
in a country such as Germany would find the cost of a foreign disposal site
such as one in France, together with the transportation cost less than the
domestic disposal cost. Even where the foreign and local disposal costs are
equal, it may be the case that the transportation cost to the French site is
less than the transportation cost to another locale in Germany. The fact that
European countries engage widely in the waste trade may then be linked to
the geographic locations of these countries.
Furthermore, it is possible that economies of scale also influence the dis-
posal choice. An example is Ireland where the economic viability of an in-
cinerator depends on the importation of 3,000 tons of waste from abroad. In
this case, if there are 2 countries similar to Ireland, each with 4,000 tons of
waste to dispose of and economically needing 8,000 tons to operate an incin-
erator efficiently, it may be better for one country to build the incinerator
and for the other to merely export its waste to the former.
5.5 Potential liability
In addition to differences in domestic environmental standards on the con-
tent of waste and the location of disposal, the extent of liability in the event
of leakage or damage from the deposited waste varies considerably across
countries. Potential liability can be based either on cost of cleanup, or on
the profit a firm gains from disposing of the waste cheaply but poorly. Lia-
bility data is scant. In the US, liability is often based on the social costs of
inadequate management of waste, or on the cleanup costs, as in the EPA's
Superfund. However, in Norway, Sweden and Finland, the penalty fee is
often associated with the profit surplus gained by the violation.
6 Governments
So far, it appears that in some cases where the government prohibits the
disposal of certain types of hazardous waste domestically, generators of haz-
ardous waste tend to export abroad. This is true of West Germany and
Austria. There is almost no information on how much of the waste is being
illegally dumped within the countries. Similarly, countries that do not have
the appropriate facilities to deal with hazardous waste properly, such as Ire-
land and Switzerland, find that they also have no alternative but to export.
In cases where there are disposal facilities within the country but where the
cost of disposal overseas, inclusive of transportation cost, is less, generators
will act as profit maximizers and ship the waste abroad.
Neglected in this discussion is the issue of why seemingly similar countries
choose to impose such disparate environmental standards. There have been
many who have argued that environmental concerns are secondary to the
more immediate concerns about poverty, literacy, and mortality, and that
those who pursue high environmental standards are those who have achieved
a threshold standard of living. Those who so argue that campaigning for
the environment is positively correlated with income levels must wonder why
France and Germany, much alike in their living standards, have such different
environmental standards.
A number of factors could account for these discrepancies. In particular,
we consider the following: historical incidents of environmental damage cases,
industry and manufacturing as a fraction of GDP, the mix of industries within
manufacturing, the urban population as a percentage of total population, and
the skewness of the domestic income distribution.
J We note that in 1990, 70 percent of GDP in Germany comes from industry
and manufacturing while in Austria, 64 percent of GDP is in industry. Both
countries have strict domestic environmental regulations. This relationship
may be due to the fact that the total amount of pollution is higher when
a country has a higher percentage of its GDP being attributed to industry
and therefore environmental issues draw more attention or may be because
the probability of environmental damage rises with the higher percentage of
GDP in industry.
There does not appear to be any relationship between the percent of in-
dustry that is chemical-related or heavy machinery-related and the stringency
of regulations. Nor does there appear to be a link between the skewness of
income distribution and the environmental standards in waste disposal. Our
statistic on income distribution is the fraction of the income in the hands of
the top 10 percent of the population divided by the bottom 40 percent. IfI this fraction is large, then income distribution is exceedingly skewed. Due tothe fact that the number of environmental damage incidents predominantlyoccur in transit or in the less developed countries where disposal facilities are
inadequate, historical incidents at home appear to be rare in the developed
counries 11 r Europe.
At the same time, it is worth noting the United Kingdom is the only
country with an urban population that is over 90 percent of its total pop-
ulation. This may help to explain its lax regulations. With most of its
population located in urban cities, there may be more sparsely populated
areas suitable for landfills. Countries with a low percent of urban population
such as Austria, Finland and Ireland all tend to export rather than import.
Perhaps the geographical dispersion of their population makes it difficult to
find appropriate sites for disposal.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider the size and sources of the international trade in
solid and hazardous waste. We assemble existing data on the trade in waste
among OECD countries and discuss potential determinants of the trade.
Contrary to prevailing wisdom, not all the international movements in waste
are from developed to less developed countries; there is a sizable trade among
developed countries. We use these flows to develop an understanding of the
determinants of waste trade.
While the numbers are sketchy and incomplete, we can draw several con-
clusions from the data. Within the OECD, unsurprisingly, countries with
high costs of disposal, either landfill or incineration, tend to be exporters.
Conversely, low cost countries are more likely to import. Other factors as-
sociated with export include a lack of incineration facilities, low urban-rural
population ratios and a higher share of GDP in manufacturing. The role
of domestic environmental regulations in cross-country flows is less clear-
cut. Countries with strict regulations tend to export, Germany and Austria,
but countries with lax regulations may import or export depending on other
factors such as population density.
The results from this first look raise more questions than they answer.
Without data on flows over time, more formal statistical analysis of the
determinants is difficult. We plan to look at data on flows among the US
states to more precisely identify regulatory and cost influences on the trade
in waste.
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Table 1: Production and Movement of Hazardous and Special Waste
Production Imports Exports
Year 1000 Tons 1000 Tons Percent 1000 Tons Percent
Australia 1980 300 0.30 0.10
Austrial 1987 400 87.00 43.50
Canada 2  1980 3290 120.00 101.00 3.10
Denmark 1988 112 9.00 8.00
Finland 1987 230 65.00 28.30
France3  1989 3000 250.00 45.00 1.50
Germany 1988 14210 20.20 805.40 5.70
Ireland 1984 20 14.00 70.00
Italy 1989 3640 3.00 0.10
Japan 1985 666 0.04
Netherlands 4  1986 1500 188.00 12.50
New Zealand 1982 60 0.20 0.30
Norway 1989 200 8.00 4.00
Spain 1987 1708 0.10
Sweden5  1985 500 30.20 6.00
Switzerland 1989 400 108.00 27.00
Turkey6  1989 300
U.K.7 1989 2200 34.20
U.S. 8 1987 238327 120.00 127.00 0.10
1) Data for export refer to 1983.
estimates.
Production data refer to 1987. Secretariat
2) Hazardous waste produced:wet weight.
3) Data on amounts imported and exported refer to 1988.
4) Excluding ship cleaning residuals.
5) Data on amounts imported and exported refer to 1988.
6) Secretariat estimates.
7) Fiscal year commencing April 1.
8) Data on amounts imported and exported refer to 1988.
Table 2: Country Characteristics
% GDP in Income Income Incineration
Industry Growth' Distribution2  Facility
Australia 0.1% na 46% 3.3% 1.67 (1985) na
Austria 43.5% na 64% 2.1% na na
Canada 3.1% 3.6% 63% (1988) 3.2% 1.38 (1987) na
Denmark 8.0% na 47% 1.7% 1.28 (1981) yes
Finland 24.0% na 59% 3.6% 1.18 (1981) yes
France 1.4% 8.3% 50% 2.1% 1.39 (1979) yes
Germany 18.0% 0.1% 70% 1.7% 1.20 (1984) yes
Ireland 70.0% na 38% (1988) 2.4% 1.24 (1973) no
Netherlands 13.0% na 51% 1.7% 1.14 (1983) yes
Sweden 6.0% na 59% 2.0% 0.98 (1981) yes
Switzerland 27.0% na na 2.3% 1.76 (1982) no
U.K. na 1.5% 69% (1988) 2.3% 1.00 (1979) yes
U.S. 0.1% 0.01% 55% (1988) 2.8% 1.59 (1985) yes
oUrban % of Industry
Incineration 3 in Chemicals, Landfill
Costs (per ton) Population Regulations 3  Transport, Costs% of Total MachineryMachinery
Australia na 85.5 na 28 na
Austria na 57.4 S 33 na
Canada na 76.3 S 35 na
Denmark $115 86.1 L 33 $54
Finland $40 59.8 L 30 $14
France $60 74.0 L 40 $20
Germany $130 86.2 S 54 $60
Ireland na 58.7 L 45 $38
Netherlands $115 88.5 L 38 $44
Sweden $54 83.9 L 42 $54
Switzerland na 60.9 L na na
U.K. $52 92.3 L 44 $24
U.S. $58 74.0 S 43 $40
1) Annual growth rate, 1979-1989.
2) Ratio of top 10% to bottom 40%.
3) S=strict. L=lax.
3 ) . . . . . . .t . . ... ..
